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Abstract: Real computer-based systems fail, and hence are often far less
dependable than their owners and users need and desire. Individuals,
organisations and indeed the world at large are becoming more dependent on
such systems, so there has been much work on trying to gain increased
understanding of the many and varied types of faults that need to be prevented or
tolerated in order to reduce the probability and severity of system failures. In this
paper  I analyze the concept of system faults and failures, and discuss the
assumptions that are often made by computing system designers regarding faults,
and a number of continuing research issues related to fault tolerance.
Keywords: Dependability, formal concepts, fault assumptions.
1 On Fault-Tolerant Computing
The direct origins of modern fault-tolerant computing lie in John von Neumann’s
influential work in the early 1950s on “Probabilistic Logic and the Synthesis of
Reliable Organisms from Unreliable Components” [22]. In the 1950s and 1960s much
work was done on hardware fault tolerance, from the (widespread) use of error
detecting and correcting codes, to the more exotic realms of replicated processors,
automatic reconfiguration, etc., used in highly demanding environments, e.g. in
aerospace. However, in the software world, the notion of dependability was still
equated to that of correctness – indeed, of perfecting the software development process.
In 1968 I participated in the first NATO Software Engineering Conference at
Garmisch in Bavaria [17]. The participants constituted a broad international cross-
section of industry, government and academia. What was special and novel about this
conference was the readiness of these participants to face up to the at times very
serious faults in the whole process by means of which software was then specified,
designed, implemented and deployed. The impact of this conference, particularly on
many of the attendees, was therefore immense. For example, both Edsger Dijkstra and I
later went on record as to how the discussions at this conference on the “software
crisis” had strongly influenced our thinking and our subsequent research activities. In
his case the discussions prompted his study of formal approaches to producing high
quality, indeed formally validated, programs. In my case they led me to the belief that
large software systems would essentially always contain residual design faults and,
following my move to Newcastle soon after the Garmisch Conference, to the then
novel and controversial idea that it was worth trying to find means by which such
                                                           
1 Much of this paper is based closely on some of the material in my BCS/IEE 1999 Turing
Memorial Lecture [19]
systems could nevertheless be made adequately reliable. (As I’ve remarked before, our
respective choices of research problems suitably reflect our relative skills as
programmers.)
A detailed study that I and my colleagues were commissioned to make in 1970 of a
number of large on-line computer systems confirmed that software faults were a major
cause of undependability in these systems, and more importantly, resulted in our
finding that:
(i) a significant fraction of the code in these systems was aimed at detecting and
recovering from errors caused by hardware and operational faults,
(ii) this code was ad hoc and limited in its capability, e.g. concerning the
possibility of concurrent faults, or of further errors being detected while error
recovery was already being attempted, yet
(iii) nevertheless, somewhat fortuitously, these error recovery facilities did in fact
help to provide a useful measure of software fault tolerance.
This study marked the start of a still-continuing, and indeed now greatly-expanded,
programme of research at Newcastle on system dependability, and in particular fault
tolerance (for various types of fault), which has been funded by a succession of
research grants from UK and European government sources, and from industry. The
subject of fault tolerance continues, even thirty years later, to fascinate me – my aim in
this talk is to try to explain why.
2 On Dependability Concepts
The concept of a “fault” is surprisingly subtle – or, as I would prefer to put it,
“gloriously recursive”. Indeed, clarifying the concepts related to dependability is
difficult – and hence vitally important – when one is talking about systems in which
(i) there is potential confusion regarding the placement and nature of system
boundaries
(ii) the very complexity of the systems (and their specification, if they have one)
is a major problem,
(iii) judgements as to possible causes or consequences of failure can be very
subtle, and
(iv) there are (fallible) provisions for preventing faults from causing failures.
From early on in our work at Newcastle on software fault tolerance we realised the
inadequacy, with regard to residual design faults, of the definitions of terms such as
fault and error used at that time by hardware designers. The problem was that they took
as the basis of their definitions a set of terms for a few well-known forms of fault, such
as “stuck-at-zero” faults, “bridging” faults, etc. This approach did not seem at all
appropriate for thinking about residual design faults, given the huge variety, and the
lack of any useful classification, of such faults. In fact, we eventually realised that we
could achieve the generality we needed by starting not from faults, but from the
concept of a system “failure” [20].
The ensuing generality of our definitions led us to start using the term “reliability”
in a much broader sense than was then common, since a system might fail in all sorts of
ways – it might deliver the wrong results, work too slowly, fail to protect confidential
information, lead to someone’s death, or whatever. Our over-generalisation of the term
“reliability” was not well received, and it was a French colleague, Jean-Claude Laprie
of LAAS-CNRS, who came to our linguistic rescue by proposing the use of the term
“dependability” [13] for the concept underlying our broadened definition. The term
dependability thus can be seen as including, as special cases, such properties as
availability, reliability, safety, confidentiality, integrity, etc. These are illustrated in
Figure 1, taken from [14], as being attributes of dependability.
DEPENDABILITY
ATTRIBUTES
AVAILABILITY 
RELIABILITY
SAFETY
CONFIDENTIALITY
INTEGRITY
MAINTAINABILITY
FAULT PREVENTION
FAULT TOLERANCE
FAULT REMOVAL
FAULT FORECASTING
MEANS
THREATS
FAULTS
ERRORS
FAILURES
Fig. 1. The dependability tree
Quoting from the latest published version of the dependability definitions [3]2.
“A system failure occurs when the delivered service deviates from
fulfilling the system function, the latter being what the system is aimed
at..”
The phrase “what the system is aimed at” is a means of avoiding reference to a
system “specification” – since it is not unusual for a system’s lack of dependability to
be due to inadequacies in its documented specification. (I return to the issue of
inadequate specifications below.)
Systems of interest will possess an internal state:
“An error is that part of the system state which is liable to lead to
subsequent failure: an error affecting the service is an indication that a
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failure occurs or has occurred. The adjudged or hypothesised cause of an
error is a fault.”
Note that an error may be judged to have multiple causes, and does not necessarily
lead to a failure – for example error recovery might be attempted successfully and
failure averted.
“A failure occurs when an error ‘passes through’ the system-user
interface and affects the service delivered by the system – a system of
course being composed of components which are themselves systems.
Thus the manifestation of failures, faults and errors follows a
“fundamental chain”:
. . . Æ failure Æ fault Æ error Æ failure Æ fault Æ. . .”
One example of this fundamental chain is as follows:
“the result of a programmer’s error is a (dormant) fault in the written
software (faulty instruction(s) or data); upon activation (invoking the
component where the fault resides and triggering the faulty instruction,
instruction sequence or data by an appropriate input pattern) the fault
becomes active and produces an error; if and when the erroneous data
affect the delivered service (in value and/or in timing of their delivery), a
failure occurs.” [12].
The recognition of the importance of this chain – which takes the form of
. . . Æ event Æ cause Æ state Æ event Æ cause  Æ . . .
led to a great increase in our ability to understand, and to design means of ameliorating,
all sorts of complex manifestations of undependability. This chain can go from one
system to:
(i) some enclosing system of which it is a component,
(ii) another essentially separate system with which it is deployed, or from
(iii) a further system(s) that it creates
Let me illustrate some of these possibilities by a further example:
A fighter plane crashed killing the pilot – it turned out that it had for a
period before this failure (i.e. the crash) been calculating its position
erroneously, and that this was due to it having been fitted with the wrong
(albeit correctly functioning) inertial navigation subsystem. One could
describe this as the fault. In fact, this fault had arisen as the result of a
failure of the (largely human) system responsible for maintaining the
plane. But this failure (i.e. the act of installing the wrong inertial
navigation subsystem) could in part be blamed on a much earlier failure
of the system that had specified and designed the whole plane
maintenance system; it had created a situation in which two functionally
distinct inertial navigation subsystems had identical mechanical
interfaces, and catalogue numbers that differed by only one in the least
significant digit! This was surely a situation that was a positive invitation
to disaster. In fact it was eventually determined that the erroneous
catalogue number had been generated as a result of a hitherto un-noticed
failure by the computerised inventory control system. This failure was
due to the fact that an overflow had occurred from a quantity field into
the catalogue number field, in a COBOL program that contained no
checks against overflow. So, here we have a whole set of different
systems, and a complicated chain, in which failures in one system
constituted faults in other systems that created erroneous states which
were not corrected but instead led to further failures.
This did actually happen. The good news is that the overall inventory control
process, which was part-manual, part-automated, was in other respects so well
designed and managed that it was possible to determine when the overflow had
occurred and which other planes also had been fitted with the wrong inertial navigation
subsystem – so other impending fatalities were averted. In fact, some of the most
important sources of the whole subject of database transactions and integrity controls
derive in large part from this work, which was carried out by C.T. Davies, first for the
U.S. Air Force, and later at IBM, and led to the creation of the very influential “spheres
of control” concept  [6].
The wording that has been in use for some time as a definition of computer system
dependability per se is:
“Dependability is defined as that property of a computer system such
that reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers. (The
service delivered by a system is its behaviour as it is perceptible by its
user(s); a user is another system (human or physical) which interacts
with the former.)”
I now feel it possible, and worthwhile, to improve on the definition of “failure” in
order to make explicit the judgement that is involved, and to use this more directly in
the definition of dependability.  First the alternative definition of failure:
A given system, operating in some particular environment (a wider
system), may fail in the sense that some other system makes, or could in
principle have made, a judgement that the activity or inactivity of the
given system constitutes failure.
The second system, the judgemental system, may be an automated system, a human
being, the relevant judicial authority or whatever. (It may or may not have a
documented system specification to guide it.) Different judgemental systems might, of
course, come to different decisions regarding the given system. Moreover, such a
judgemental system might itself fail – in the eyes of some other judgemental system – a
possibility that is well understood by the legal system, with its hierarchy of courts. So,
we can have a (recursive) notion of “failure” which is defined merely in terms of what
are taken as the fundamental, dictionary-defined, concepts of “system” and
“judgement”, and which clearly is a relative rather than an absolute notion. So then is
the concept of dependability:
The concept of dependability can be simply defined as “the quality or
characteristic of being dependable”, where the adjective “dependable” is
attributed to a system whose failures are judged sufficiently rare or
insignificant.
It should be noted that these definitions, and the four basic means of obtaining and
establishing high dependability, namely fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal
and fault forecasting, are as applicable to human and industrial systems, as they are to
computer systems. In particular they are applicable to the part-manual part-automated
systems, i.e. “computer-based systems”, including those that are used to design and
implement computer systems. This generality, and the explicit role given to judgement,
are important given the subtleties that are sometimes involved in identifying the exact
boundaries of the various systems of concern, of resolving disagreements regarding the
acceptability of a system’s specified and/or actual behaviour, and of determining how
blame should be apportioned after a system fails.
2.1 Concept Formalisation
In fact, since a first version of this discussion was published [19], my colleague
Cliff Jones has, to my great delight, taken up very seriously the problem of providing a
formalisation of these basic dependability concepts. I have long regretted the lack of
such a formalisation, since I recall how much benefit I, at least, obtained from my
collaboration many years ago with Jim Horning on a paper for Computing Surveys on
process structuring concepts [10]. (This paper interlaced informal and formal
definitions of a large number of concepts related to processes, process combination and
process abstraction, using a few rather basic mathematical concepts, such as sets,
sequences, relations, and functions.) Subsequently, much of my research, in particular
my recent involvement in work on Co-ordinated Atomic Actions (see below), has been
greatly helped by the efforts of my more formal colleagues,
The formalisation of the basic dependability concepts in [11] is introduced in the
following terms:
“The idea here is to offer definitions of [the terms fault, error, failure]
with respect to a particular notion of what constitutes a system. . . . The
intention here is not to offer formalism for its own sake. In fact the
details of the particular notation, etc., are unimportant. The hope is that
understanding can be increased by employing a firm foundation. [. . .]
some interesting relationships between systems are explored. The
propagation of fault, error, failure chains where one system is built on
another system are well-understood. Many of the failure propagation
systems of interest in socio-technical systems arise when one system is
created by another. Lastly, the idea of one system being deployed with
another is considered.”
The systems that are dealt with are thus both technical and socio-technical (e.g.
computer-based) systems, and include systems (e.g. “real-time” control systems) that
are linked to processes that evolve autonomously. The formalism Cliff uses is in fact
VDM, though he points out that Z and B would be equally appropriate.
One of the main divergences between Cliff and myself concerns the role played by
a “specification”. Quoting again from his paper:
“[My view] is that the judgement that a system fails can only be made
against a specification. What if the “specification is wrong”?
Presumably, this means that the specification is in some sense
inappropriate; the specification might be precise, but it can be seen to
result in faults and failures in a bigger system. For example, a
specification might state that a developer can assume that the user might
respond in one micro-second but failing to so do can result in fatal
consequences. The developer writes a program which “times out” after
one micro-second and an accident occurs. It surely is not right to say that
the software system (which meets its specification) is failing. Nor of
course is it reasonable to blame “operator error” with such an
unreasonable assumption. The only reasonable conclusion is that it is an
earlier system which exhibited erroneous behaviour: the act of producing
the silly specification is the failure that caused a fault in the combined
system of software and operator. The judgement that a specification is
“silly” must of course be made by another (external) system. A similar
argument can be made for missing specifications: an engineering process
requires a reference point.”
I remain to be convinced on this point. I have seen systems whose facilities and
interfaces are so intuitive and well-chosen that users can immediately understand how
to operate them, and have to turn to the manual, assuming there is one, only in
extremis. Moreover, they can with little difficulty recognize any such failures as do
occur as being failures by their inconsistency with respect to other aspects of the
perceived behaviour of the system. On the other hand, in my experience specifications
of large computer or computer-based systems are rarely complete, in the sense that one
can guarantee that any implementation that satisfies the specification will be regarded
as fully satisfactory by the people who are in a position to judge the system. Rather,
specifications should act as constraints, possibly extremely detailed constraints, that
enable one to state various (pre-conceived)  ways in which a system would be regarded
as inadequate.
The notion of the superiority of such “negative” specifications is in fact one of the
important ideas in Alexander’s very influential book “Notes on the Synthesis of Form”
[1]:
 “. . . every design problem begins with an effort to achieve fitness
between two entities: the form in question and its context. The form is
the solution to the problem; the context defines the problem. In other
words, when we speak of design, the real object of discussion is not the
form alone, but the ensemble comprising the form and its context. Good
fit is a desired property of this ensemble which relates to some particular
division of the ensemble into form and context. . . . It seems as though in
practice the concept of good fit, describing only the absence of such
failures and hence leaving us nothing concrete to refer to in explanation,
can only be explained indirectly; it is, in practice, the disjunction of all
possible misfits.
In the case of a design problem which is truly problematical, we . . . have
no intrinsic way of reducing the potentially infinite set of requirements to
finite terms. Yet for practical reasons we do need some way of picking a
finite set from the infinite set of possible ones. In the case of
requirements, no sensible way of picking this finite set presents itself.
From a purely descriptive standpoint we have no way of knowing which
of the infinitely many relations between form and context to include, and
which ones to leave out. But if we think of the requirements from a
negative point of view, as misfits, there is a simple way of picking a
finite set. This is because it is through misfit that the problem originally
brings itself to our attention. We take just those relations between form
and context which obtrude most strongly, which demand attention most
clearly, which seem most likely to go wrong. We cannot do better than
this. . . .
In the case of a real design problem, even our conviction that there is
such a thing as fit to be achieved is curiously flimsy and insubstantial.
We are searching for some kind of harmony between two intangibles; a
form which we have not yet designed, and a context we cannot properly
describe. The only reason we have for thinking that there must be some
kind of fit to be achieved between them is that we can detect
incongruities, or negative instances of it.
Such detection of course involves judgement – both while the design is being
created, and for any resulting real (i.e. fallible) system, while this system is deployed.
Hence my view is that system specifications are, at least conceptually, just a valuable
adjunct to an authoritative judgement system. (An analogy I would make is to the
notion of a contract – normally one would expect this to be written and signed – but in
some situations and environments a handshake will be equally acceptable and indeed
binding in law.) But in practice, as stated in [11], “it is difficult to see how an
engineering process can be used to create a system where there is no initial notion of
specifying the required properties of the to-be-created artefact”. One can hardly rely
entirely on some scheme of having all the designers continuously interrogating a judge
throughout the design process! However, with regard to dependability concept
definitions, I still prefer to avoid involving reference to a specification.
For example, Cliff’s specification-oriented approach led him to the following
definition of the notion of an error: “An error is present when the state of a system is
inconsistent with that required by the specification”. In contrast, the definition I am
used to is: “An error is that part of the system state that may cause a subsequent failure:
a failure occurs when an error reaches the service interface and alters the service.” No
doubt this definition could be clarified through formalisation, but I feel this should be
done using judgement rather than specification as a starting point.
This is because, in my view, there will often be considerable subjective judgement
involved in identifying errors, particularly errors due to design faults in complex
software. Once a fault has been activated, all subsequent state transitions up to the
occurrence of a failure are to be regarded as errors. However, identifying the fault
occurrence involves deciding which instruction, or set of instructions, is incorrect or
missing, i.e. how the faulty program compares with “the” correct program. But there
could be several, equally sensible ways of correcting a program, and hence
identifications of the location of “the” fault in the code, the moment when it was
activated, and its subsequent errors – and it is not evident that a specification could or
should be so detailed as to provide means of adjudicating between these different
equally-correct programs.
A rather different situation, also illustrating the distinction between these two
definitions of error, is that of a system failure which comes to be regarded as due to
some earlier failure of another system, either one it is deployed with, or one it was
created by. The state of the given system prior to its failure will be erroneous by the
definition that I favour. This is the case even if is decided that the given system was
correctly processing the faulty inputs it received, or is correctly interpreting the faulty
design that it incorporates, (so that its state is in all probability consistent with its
specification, should one have been documented).
Nevertheless, despite such differences of approach, I very much welcome Cliff’s
contribution to the development and fomalisation of dependability concepts, and hope
to contribute to extending it to deal with further basic dependability concepts. One such
is that of “dependence” – which, perhaps surprisingly, has not been dealt with in the
standard accounts of dependability concepts and terminology, so is the main point I
deal with next.
2.2 Dependence, Trust and Confidence
It is commonplace to say that the dependability of a system should suffice for the
dependence being placed on that system. What we term the “dependence of system A
on system B” is thus a measure of the impact of B’s undependability on A’s
dependability. Clearly, this can vary from total dependence (any failure of B will cause
A to fail) to complete independence (B cannot cause A to fail). In other words,
dependence can be defined as a measure of the difference between the dependability
that A would have, were B to be totally dependable, with that which A has in the
presence of the actual (presumably less than fully dependable) B.
If there is reason to believe that B’s dependability is insufficient for A’s required
dependability, the former must be enhanced, and/or A’s dependence reduced, and/or
additional means of fault tolerance introduced “between” A and B, e.g. in the form of a
“wrapper”.
The concept of dependence leads on to those of “trust” and “confidence”, two terms
that are much in current vogue in the EU IST Programme. (Another word in common
use in some circles is “trustworthiness” – which I in fact regard as being synonomous
with “dependability.”) In my view, trust can very conveniently be defined as “accepted
dependence” – i.e. the dependence (say of A on B) allied to a judgement that this level
of dependence is acceptable. Such a judgement (made by or on behalf of A) about B is
possibly explicit, and even laid down in a contract between A and B, but might be only
implicit, even unthinking. Indeed it might even be unwilling – in that A has no
alternative option but to put its trust in B.
Thus to the extent that A trusts B, it need not assume responsibility for, i.e. provide
means of tolerating, B’s failures. (The question of whether it is capable of doing this is
another matter.). Indeed, turning things around, the extent to which A fails to provide
means of tolerating B’s faults is a measure of A’s (perhaps unthinking or unwilling)
trust in B.
Thus the notion of trust is applicable to technical or socio-technical systems, as well
as to humans. A distinction between trust and confidence is that the former leads to the
act of becoming dependent, the latter is inapplicable to technical systems, since it
concerns how some human, or group of humans, might feel about this act. A system
which provides evidence which can be used to attempt to justify A’s trust in B, i.e. to
provide confidence regarding A’s dependence on B, can itself of course fail. One type
of failure of such a confidence-building system (which might be system A itself),
produces an underestimate of A’s dependence on B, which could lead to a decision to
avoid using B, even though B is adequately dependable. What is normally a more
serious type of failure of a confidence-building system puts A at unacceptable risk of
failing due to a failure of B, i.e. of a “trusted” system turning out to be
“untrustworthy”.
2.3 Concepts and Terminology
This continued interest that I and a number of people involved in dependability
research take in concepts and definitions perhaps seems rather pedantic, though I
believe it is fully justified. One reason of course is the subtleties involved, and the need
to clarify them. Another is the fact that a number of what are essentially dependability
concepts are being re-invented (sometimes rather incompetently), or at least re-named,
in numerous research communities, which variously categorise their area of interest as
safety, survivability, trustworthiness, security, critical infrastructure protection,
information survivability, or whatever.
The issue of whether the different research communities use a common set of terms
is much less important than their failure to recognise that they are concerning
themselves with (different facets of) the same concept. One consequence is that they
are not getting as much advantage from each other’s insights and advances as they
might. However, regardless of the terminology employed, I believe it is very important
to have, and to use, some term for the general concept, i.e. that which is associated with
a fully general notion of failure as opposed to one which is restricted in some way to
particular types, causes or consequences of failure. (I also believe it is essential to have
separate terms for the three essentially different concepts named here “fault”, “error”
and “failure” – since otherwise one cannot deal properly with the complexities (and
realities) of failure-prone components, being assembled together in possibly incorrect
ways, so resulting in failure-prone systems.) Only when this is done will, I believe, the
researchers take an adequately general approach to the problems that they are
attempting to tackle. And if I manage to put over only one point in this lecture – this is
the one I hope it will be.
In fact, time and time again it seems to me that muddled thinking about
dependability-related notions has been a barrier to progress – most recently I have been
alerted to this in the work of the “intrusion detection” research community. This
community concerns itself with a major aspect of the problem of protecting computer
networks and networked computers from hackers. As some of the researchers involved
have admitted, the community has got itself into very confused and confusing debates
as it tries to expand its horizons beyond the problem of merely detecting the fact that
some hacker is, or has recently been, intruding into a system. I will return to this topic
later.
3 On Fault Classification
As I have indicated, the faults that might affect a computer-based system are many
and varied. A detailed classification is provided by Laprie [14], the first part of which
is summarised in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Fault classification
The actual application of this classification itself involves judgement. For example,
is a hardware component that occasionally fails as a result of electronic interference
suffering temporary operational physical faults, or should one regard it as having been
provided with inadequate shielding, i.e. regard the situation as being due to a
permanent human-made development fault? Nevertheless, such classifications can
provide useful guidance, in particular with regard to planning means of fault
prevention, tolerance, diagnosis, and removal, based on the designer’s assumptions
about likely faults. Actual automated fault tolerance strategies can however make only
limited use of such classifications, depending on the extent to which faults can be
quickly and accurately recognised as belonging to a class for which some specialised
fault tolerance measure is particularly appropriate. This is often not feasible – for
example, it is often difficult to be sure whether the immediate cause of an error is an
operational hardware fault or a residual software design fault, so if both possibilities
are to be allowed for a very general fault tolerance strategy must be employed.
Logical, or qualitative, classification is however just a starting point. All work on
system dependability is, or at any rate should be, guided by considerations of relative
probabilities. There is little point, for example, in providing a parity bit with each byte
being transmitted over a network if the most common form of fault causes long bursts
of errors. Similarly, there is little point employing expensive and time-consuming code
verification tools if in a particular application domain virtually all the significant
failures arise from inadequate system specifications. The success with which one can
design a system that will achieve some required level fault of tolerance therefore
depends on the quality of the statistics that are available, or of the statistical
assumptions made by the designers, concerning the faults that will occur.
In principle, and often in practice, one can have relatively accurate statistics
concerning operational hardware faults, detailed enough to provide very useful
guidance as to what specific fault tolerance measures are needed where, and what ones
are not worth their cost. When it comes to residual design faults, such statistics as are
available are too imprecise to be of much use, so fault tolerance provisions have to be
very general. Thus one of the motivations behind the original recovery block scheme
[9] was to provide means of error recovery that would work (almost) no matter what
fault existed where in the suspect program.
ensure acceptance  test
by primary alternate
else by alternate 2
.
.
else by alternate n
else error
Fig. 3. The Recovery Block Structure
With the program structuring scheme that we developed this was the case so long as
the underlying recovery and control mechanism was not corrupted. However, the
degree to which the error recovery mechanism could be used to provide successful
fault tolerance, i.e., enable the program to continue and produce satisfactory results, of
course depended on the adequacy of the programmer-supplied error detection measures
(such as acceptance tests) and last-ditch alternate blocks. Our first demonstration
recovery block system involved a fault-tolerant application program containing a
complete acceptance test and final alternate block, running on a simulated machine
which completely confined programs within their allotted resources. We then provided
visitors with means of making arbitrary changes to the code of any or all of the
alternate blocks (other than the final one) in the running application program – the
challenge to them being to find some means of preventing the program from producing
correct results. Within a short period of time this demonstration system had been honed
to the point where no visitors were able to subvert it. This demonstration was a very
compelling one.
The demonstration in fact indicated that when the concern is with the possibility of
malicious faults the only sensible thing is to assume that the situation is statistically as
bad as could be imagined – that faults occur at locations, in circumstances, and with a
frequency, that are essentially “pessimal” from a designer’s viewpoint. (The term
“pessimal” is in fact not in the dictionary, though its meaning, and the need for such a
word, are I claim both self-evident.) I will return to the problems of tolerating
malicious faults later.
4 On Fault Assumptions
The problems of preventing faults in systems from leading to system failures vary
greatly in difficulty depending on the (it is hoped justified) assumptions that the
designers make about the nature as well as the frequency of the faults, and the
effectiveness of the fault tolerance mechanisms that are employed. For example, one
might choose to assume that operational hardware faults can be cost-effectively
masked (i.e. hidden) by the use of hardware replication and voting, and that any
residual software design faults can be adequately masked by the use of design
diversity, i.e. using N-version programming. In such circumstances error recovery is
not needed. In many realistic situations, however, if the likelihood of a failure is to be
kept within acceptable bounds, error recovery facilities will have to be provided, in
addition to whatever fault prevention and fault masking techniques are used.
In a decentralised system, i.e. one whose activity can be usefully modelled by a set
of partly independent threads of control, the problems of error recovery will vary
greatly depending on what design assumptions can be justified. For example, if the
designer concerns him/herself simply with a distributed database system and disallows
(i.e. ignores) the possibility of undetected invalid inputs or outputs, the errors that have
to be recovered from will essentially all be ones that are wholly within the computer
system. In this situation backward error recovery (i.e. recovery to an earlier, it is hoped
error-free, state) will suffice, and be readily implementable, such is the nature of
computer storage. If such a system is serving the needs of a set of essentially
independent users, competing against each other to access and perhaps update the
database, then the now extensive literature on database transaction processing and
protocols can provide a fertile source of well-engineered, and mathematically well-
founded, solutions to such problems [8].
However, the multiple activities in a decentralised system will often not simply be
competing against each other for access to some shared internal resource, but rather
will on occasion at least be attempting to co-operate with each other, in small or large
groups, in pursuit of some common goal. This will make the provision of backward
error recovery more complicated than is the case in basic transaction-oriented systems.
And the problem of avoiding the “domino effect”[20], in which a single fault can lead
to a whole sequence of rollbacks, will be much harder if one cannot disallow (i.e.
ignore) the possibility of undetected invalid communications between activities.
When a system of interacting threads employs backward recovery, each thread will
be continually establishing and discarding checkpoints, and may also on occasion need
to restore its state to one given in a previously established checkpoint. But if
interactions are not controlled, and appropriately co-ordinated with checkpoint
management, then the rollback of one thread can result in a cascade of rollbacks that
could push all the threads back to their beginnings.
inter-thread communication checkpoint
T1
T2
Fig, 4. The domino effect
However, the domino effect would not occur if it could safely be assumed that data
was fully validated before it was output, i.e. was transmitted from one thread to
another. (Similarly, the effect would be avoided if a thread could validate its inputs
fully.) Such an assumption is in effect made in simple transaction-based systems, in
which outputs are allowed to occur only after a transaction has been “committed”.
Moreover, in such systems the notion of commitment is regarded as absolute, so that
once the commitment has been made, there is no going back, i.e. there is no provision
for the possibility that an output was invalid. The notion of nested transactions can be
used to limit the amount of activity that has to be abandoned when backward recovery
(of small inner transactions) is invoked. However, this notion typically still assumes
that there are absolute “outermost” transactions, and that outputs to the world outside
the database system, e.g. to the users, that take place after such outermost transactions
end must be presumed to be valid.
The conversation scheme [4] provides a means of co-ordinating the recovery
provisions of interacting threads so as to avoid the domino effect, without making
assumptions regarding output or input validation. Figure 5 shows an example where
three threads communicate within a conversation and the threads T1 and T2
communicate within a nested conversation. (Not all of these threads need represent
activity inside a computer – some might represent activity in its environment.)
Communication can only take place between threads that are participating in a
conversation together, so while T1 and T2 are in their inner conversation they cannot
damage or be damaged by T3.
The operation of a conversation is as follows: (i) on entry to a conversation a thread
establishes a checkpoint; (ii) if an error is detected by any thread then all the
participating threads must restore their checkpoints; (iii) after restoration all threads
then attempt to make further progress; and (iv) all threads leave the conversation
together, only if all pass any acceptance tests that are provided. (If this is not possible,
the conversation fails – a situation that causes the enclosing conversation to invoke
backward error recovery at its level.)
inter-thread communication checkpoint
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Fig. 5. Nested conversations
Both transactions and conversations are examples of atomic actions [16], in that
viewed from the outside, they appear to perform their activity as a single indivisible
action. (In practice transaction-support systems also implement other properties, such
as “durability”, i.e. a guarantee that the results produced by completed transactions will
not be lost as a result of a computer hardware fault.) And both rely on backward error
recovery.
However, systems are usually not made up just of computers – rather they will also
involve other entities (e.g. devices and humans) which in many cases will not be able
to simply forget some of their recent activity, and so simply go straight back to an
exact earlier state when told that an error has been detected. Thus forward error
recovery (the typical programming mechanism for which is exception handling), rather
than backward recovery will have to be used. Each of these complications individually
makes the task of error recovery more difficult, and together they make it much more
challenging. This in fact is the topic that I and colleagues have concentrated on these
last few years.
Our Co-ordinated Atomic (CA) Action scheme [23] was arrived at as a result of
work on extending the conversation concept so as to allow for the use of forward error
recovery, and to allow for both co-operative and competitive concurrency. CA actions
can be regarded as providing a discipline, both for programming computers and for
controlling their use within an organisation. This discipline is based on nested multi-
threaded transactions [5] together with very general exception handling provisions.
Within the computer(s), CA actions augment any fault tolerance that is provided by the
underlying transaction system by providing means for dealing with (i) unmasked
hardware and software faults that have been reported to the application level to deal
with, and/or (ii) application-level failure situations that have to be responded to.
Summarising, the concurrent execution threads participating in a given CA action
enter and leave the action synchronously. (This synchronisation might be either actual
or logical.) Within the CA action, operations on objects can be performed co-
operatively by roles executing in parallel. If an error is detected inside a CA action,
appropriate forward and/or backward recovery measures must be invoked co-
operatively, by all the roles, in order to reach some mutually consistent conclusion. To
support backward error recovery, a CA action must provide a recovery line that co-
ordinates the recovery points of the objects and threads participating in the action so as
to avoid the domino effect. To support forward error recovery, a CA action must
provide an effective means of co-ordinating the use of exception handlers. An
acceptance test can and ideally should be provided in order to determine whether the
outcome of the CA action is successful. Error recovery for participating threads of a
CA action generally requires the use of explicit error co-ordination mechanisms, i.e.
exception handling or backward error recovery within the CA action; objects that are
external to the CA action and so can be shared with other actions and threads must
provide their own error co-ordination mechanisms and behave atomically with respect
to other CA actions and threads.
Figure 6 shows an example in which two concurrent threads enter a CA action in
order to play the corresponding roles. Within the CA action the two concurrent roles
communicate with each other and manipulate the external objects co-operatively in
pursuit of some common goal – portrayed in the Figure by the arrow from Role 1 to
Role 2. However, during the execution of the CA action, an exception e is raised by
Role 2. Role 1 is then informed of the exception and both roles transfer control to their
respective exception handlers H1 and H2 for this particular exception, which then
attempt to perform forward error recovery. (When multiple exceptions are raised within
an action, a resolution algorithm based on an exception resolution graph [4, 27] is used
to identify the appropriate “covering” exception, and hence the set of exception
handlers to be used in this situation.) The effects of erroneous operations on external
objects are repaired, if possible, by putting the objects into new correct states so that
the CA action is able to exit with an acceptable outcome. The two threads leave the CA
action synchronously at the end of the action.
Fig. 6. Example of a CA Action
In general, the desired effect of performing a CA action is specified by an
acceptance test. The effect only becomes visible if the test is passed. The acceptance
test allows both a normal outcome and one or more exceptional (or degraded)
outcomes, with each exceptional outcome signalling a specified exception to the
surrounding environment (typically a larger CA action).
We have in recent years, with colleagues in several EU-funded research projects,
investigated the advantages and limitations of this approach to structuring systems so
as to facilitate the design and validation of sophisticated error recovery, through a
series of detailed case studies. Publications describing these include [21, 24-26, 28].
However, my purpose in describing this particular line of development in fault
tolerance was not so much to argue the merits of CA actions, but rather to illustrate the
crucial role that a designer’s choice of fault assumptions should make in directing the
subsequent design activity. (For example, the vast majority of research, and practice, in
the distributed systems world assumes that a computer fails by crashing – i.e. is a “fail-
silent” device, despite the existence of evidence that this is by no means always the
case.) The crucial nature of this choice applies not only when one is considering the
fault assumptions underlying the design of a fault-tolerant computer, but also the merits
of a particular system design, implementation and validation process. (Which if any
aspects of this process can justifiably be assumed to be faultless – the specification, the
compiler, the formal validation?) Yet all too often, inadequate attention is paid to
identifying and justifying a set of fault assumptions – this indeed is one of the major
messages I want to put across in this talk.
5 On Structure
Another of the messages that I want to convey is the particular importance of the
role that system structuring plays in achieving dependability, especially where such
dependability has to be achieved in the face of complex system requirements, and the
complex realities of a fault-ridden world. I have had a keen personal interest for many
years in the topic of system structuring, initially motivated by work at IBM on
methodologies and tools for aiding the design of a large multiprocessing system [29]
and then at Newcastle on dependability. The earliest work at Newcastle, on recovery
blocks, was in fact all about structuring. Recovery blocks offer a means of introducing
lots of extra redundant code into an application (acceptance tests and alternate blocks)
without greatly adding to the overall system complexity. Unless this were the case, the
scheme would of course be self-defeating.
The recovery block structure, with its underlying recovery cache for automating the
provision of checkpoints, avoids causing a complexity explosion by allowing the
programming of the different alternate blocks to be performed independently, both of
each other, and of the problems of recovering from each other’s errors. Thus, as
always, structuring is being used as a means of dividing and conquering complexity.
However, it is worth distinguishing between different sorts of complexity, and its
counterpart, simplicity.
Tony Hoare once said: “The price of reliability is utter simplicity – and this is a
price that major software manufacturers find too high to afford!” This is true, but so is
Einstein’s remark that: “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not
simpler”3
As I’ve discussed above, one can gain much simplicity by making assumptions as
to the nature of the faults that will not occur (whether in system specification, design or
operation). But this will be a spurious simplicity if the assumptions are false. Good
system structuring allows one to deal with the added complexity that result from more
realistic fault assumptions.
What is meant here by good structuring is not just the conventional characteristics,
such as coupling and cohesion, that are used to determine the impact of structuring on
performance, but also a characteristic which might be termed “strength”. A strongly-
structured system is one in which the structuring exists in the actual system, (as
opposed to being used just in descriptions of, or the design for, a system) and helps to
limit the impact of any faults – the analogy being to water-tight bulkheads in a ship.
For example, one of the standard (hardware) fault tolerance techniques is Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR) – figure 7 is a typical illustration, found in many
textbooks, of part of an overall TMR system, involving a triplicated component and
voter.
                                                           
3 As quoted in Reader’s Digest (British edition), Vol 111, No 666, October 1977, p. 164. The
German original is normally given as “Alles sollte so einfach wie möglich gemacht werden, aber
nicht einfacher”.
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Fig. 7. Triple Modular Redundancy
One of the principal assumptions underlying TMR is that its structuring is strong. A
majority vote that is obtained by collusion, whether accidental or deliberate, between
two of the triplicated components or voters, is worthless. Thus it is essential that there
to be good reason to assume that there is and can be no communication between these
components or between these votes – that they are properly insulated from each other,
that no-one has accidentally left a screw-driver across them, and – more subtly – that
they are indeed wired together in the form shown in the Figure.
Taking a software example, it would be possible to use mere programming
conventions to implement a recovery block-like approach. But the scheme is only truly
effective if there are some effective means of enforcing the required separation
between alternates, for example, so that one can have adequate reason to assume that a
residual design fault in one alternate cannot impact any of the other alternates.
6 On Diversity
Rather than continue to develop this theme of the importance of system structuring,
let me move on the topics of redundancy and diversity – which are much more specific
to fault tolerance.
All fault tolerance involves the use of redundancy – of representation and/or
activity – whose consistency can be checked. I have concentrated on what one might
term “built-in” fault tolerance – but the system design process can also benefit from
redundancy and consistency checking. For example, a system specification is likely to
be improved (to the benefit of the dependability of the resulting system) if the
specification is scrutinised by knowledgeable system designers who have the task of
creating a system to match the specification. This opportunity is of course lost if this
process is automated. And indeed, a recent experiment by Ross Anderson has
convincingly shown the advantages of massive (human) redundancy, in developing
security specifications [2].
Redundancy takes several different forms. Repeated operation of a single device, or
the parallel operation of multiple copies of such a device, can provide means of
tolerating some kinds of fault, but not in general design faults. What is needed for this
is design (including specification) diversity. Unfortunately, despite its importance, the
concept of design diversity is not at all well understood. Like complexity, it is hard to
define, leave alone to measure effectively.
The effectiveness of redundancy depends on the extent to which the diversely-
designed representations or activities are dependent upon each other with respect to
types of fault that are to be tolerated. If they are completely independent – something
that is often assumed despite being rarely if ever true – then the probability of
coincident faults can be very low indeed. Extremely high dependability could be
achieved in such circumstances, for example via the use of majority voting, assuming
that the initial non-redundant versions are already reasonably dependable.
Such independence arguments were used as the basis of highly over-optimistic
early estimates of the efficacy of N-version programming. In fact it turns out that there
is a strong theoretical basis for the non-independence of faults in “independently-
designed” software. As explained for example in [15], the demands placed upon
systems by their environment can vary in ‘difficulty’, and this variation induces
dependence upon the failure processes of different ‘diverse’ versions. Nevertheless,
redundancy, including software design diversity, can provide considerable added
dependability – though it is problematic to predict just how much, given the difficulty
of assessing the degree of dependence, indeed the degree of diversity.
Just as deliberate use of diverse designs, or of diversity in the design process, can
have significant benefits, accidental lack of diversity can have considerable dangers.
This is well known in the world of biology, for example – but the phenomenon is also
highly relevant in a computer world in which particular (ad hoc) standard platforms
and protocols are becoming increasingly dominant. One might have thought that
uniformity would lead to a reduction in complexity that would be very beneficial with
respect to dependability – unfortunately life is not so simple. A nine hour outage, on 15
January 1990, of the long-distance phone system in the USA [18] was largely due to
the fact that all the switches were of a single common design; and the impact of
computer viruses is much greater now that so many people are using basically the same
hardware and software.
So much for diversity. The topics that I have discussed so far, namely (i) fault
concepts, classification and assumptions, (ii) system structuring, and (iii) redundancy
and diversity, are to my mind the perennial central topics underlying the problem of
achieving dependability from complex systems. I hope that I have succeeded in
bringing out the fact these are a set of, so-to-speak, everlasting dependability research
topics – ones that have been studied for years and yet still need much more study.
However, let me now, against this background, devote the final part of my talk to a
brief summary of one particular research issue in dependability that is I believe
particularly topical.
7 Malicious Faults
Recently, some thirty years after we started thinking about design fault tolerance, I
had a great sense of deja vu. This wass because I and my colleagues (this time not just
in Newcastle, but also from several other research groups across Europe) were
undertaking a EU-funded research project, to see whether we could extend the scope of
fault tolerance technology (and in our case, ideas such as CA Actions) to cover a type
of fault that hitherto has largely been regarded as one to be prevented and/or removed,
rather than coped with automatically. This is the intentional malicious fault, arising
from the nefarious activities of hackers and – much worse – corrupt insiders (including
people who have systems administration roles).
Such protection is needed because the likely reality is that most large systems will
have to be used even though it is known that they contain vulnerabilities. Some of these
vulnerabilities might even have been identified already, but for some reason must be
allowed to remain in the system; other vulnerabilities will be awaiting discovery –
probably first by system hackers. Thus means for tolerating malicious faults are
needed, not just for reporting detected intrusions to the management, if continuous
service is needed from the system.
Over a decade ago I and a colleague, John Dobson, first started to think about this
sort of problem, though we did not develop the idea extensively at the time. The main
result of our work was a paper [7] whose title “Building reliable secure systems from
unreliable insecure components” (a deliberate allusion to von Neumann) both neatly
summed up our approach, and provoked one of the referees of the conference at which
it was presented, the IEEE Oakland “Privacy and Security” conference, to describe it as
“highly controversial” – though now I think the idea, or at least the aim, is more
accepted.
Indeed, the recently-completed collaborative research project to which I alluded
above, namely MAFTIA (standing for “Malicious- and Accidental- Fault-tolerant
Internet Applications”), brought together teams working on encryption, intrusion
detection, asynchronous distributed algorithms, rigorous evaluation and, of course,
fault tolerance. The project’s major innovation was a comprehensive approach for
tolerating both accidental faults and malicious attacks in large-scale distributed
systems, including attacks by external hackers and by corrupt insiders. However, this is
a whole story in itself–full details can be found from the project’s web-site, at:
http://www.newcastle.research.ec.org/maftia/
8 Concluding Remark
Much of this lecture has been aimed at trying to explain what I believe to be some
of the most important issues of long term and continuing importance in dependability.
But my fundamental aims in this lecture, implied by its title, have been first to argue
how important it is to accept the reality of human fallibility and frailty, both in the
design and the use of computer systems, and second to indicate various constructive
approaches to trying to cope with this uncomfortable reality. If such an acceptance
were more prevalent in the computer science community, it would I believe go some
way toward improving our standing, and that of our subject, among the general public.
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